Uranium Mining Becomes Central to Niger-France Diplomatic Row

The relationship between Niger and France has significantly worsened, with Niger’s military government showing increasing resolve to remove France from crucial economic areas, particularly uranium mining. This week, Orano, the French state nuclear company, reported that the junta – which overthrew France’s ally, President Mohamed Bazoum, in a July 2023 coup – had assumed operational command of its local mining subsidiary, Somaïr. The regime has prevented Somaïr from resuming exports for several months, pushing the company towards a financial crisis. The repercussions could extend broadly; despite Niger contributing under 5% of global uranium production, it supplied a quarter of the uranium to European nuclear power plants in 2022. This timing is particularly inconvenient as Western nations strive to address climate change and reduce carbon emissions from electricity generation. For French President Emmanuel Macron, who is already contending with a domestic political crisis, the possible withdrawal of Orano from Niger presents an awkward situation for his public image. This development coincides with challenging news from other long-term African allies: Chad abruptly declared the termination of a defense pact with Paris, and Senegal reiterated its demand for the eventual shutdown of the French military installation in Dakar. Regardless, the difficulties confronting Orano in Niger pose a substantial practical obstacle to France’s energy provision. With 18 nuclear power plants, comprising a total of 56 reactors, generating nearly 65% of its electricity, France has been proactive in curbing carbon emissions from its power sector. However, the nation’s own restricted uranium production ceased over 20 years ago. Consequently, in approximately the last decade, France has imported nearly 90,000 tonnes, with one-fifth originating from Niger. Only Kazakhstan, responsible for 45% of global output, served as a more significant supplier. The ongoing disruption, or a permanent cessation, of Orano’s activities in Niger would undoubtedly compel France to seek other sources. This is likely feasible, as alternative supplies are available from nations such as Uzbekistan, Australia, and Namibia. Last year, when West African nations reacted to the coup in Niger by implementing a trade embargo that halted uranium exports, other providers promptly compensated for the shortfall. The European Union’s imports of the mineral from Niger decreased by a third, but Canada largely made up for this reduction. However, this came with a politically sensitive cost. European Union imports of uranium from Russia increased by over 70%, notwithstanding the stringent sanctions placed on Moscow following its invasion of Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia has emerged as a key ally for the military leaders who have assumed control in Niger and its partner nations, Burkina Faso and Mali, since 2020. Russian military personnel are engaged alongside the Malian army in its operations against jihadists and ethnic Tuareg separatists, concurrently assisting in the protection of the top leadership of the juntas in Niger and Burkina Faso. Therefore, while France and Europe broadly could manage a permanent cessation of uranium supply from Niger, this transition would not be without challenges. At least in the short term, EU member states would likely increase their dependence on Russia and its Central Asian counterparts, thereby potentially weakening their efforts to sustain economic pressure on President Vladimir Putin during a critical phase of the Ukraine crisis. Additionally, Niger’s government, whose stance toward the EU has grown nearly as distrustful as its fractured ties with France, persists in exploring alternatives to its traditional Western alliances. Iran, a prospective buyer of uranium, has surfaced as a possibility. Diplomatic engagements between the two administrations have intensified, marked by Niger’s Prime Minister Ali Mahamane Lamine Zeine’s visit to Tehran in January. Speculation regarding a potential agreement for the provision of uranium “yellowcake” (concentrate) briefly surfaced several months prior. Concurrently, the prospects for Orano to re-establish regular uranium operations and exports from Niger appear unfavorable, owing to the antagonistic posture of the military administration in Niamey. This animosity is partially attributable to President Macron’s outspoken disapproval of the July 2023 ousting of Bazoum, who had been among his closest African political and security collaborators. Paris unequivocally supported the firm position adopted by Ecowas, the West African regional organization, and there were even suggestions that it might have been prepared to offer implicit backing if the bloc had proceeded with its brief threat of military intervention in Niger to restore Bazoum. Within this toxic environment of antagonism and suspicion, Orano presented itself as an evident and opportune target for retaliatory actions by the junta. The French company’s commanding presence in the uranium industry had for years generated resentment among many Nigériens, amid allegations that the French firm was acquiring their uranium at undervalued rates, notwithstanding periodic renegotiations of the export agreement. Although mining activities commenced years following independence, they were perceived as symbolic of France’s enduring post-colonial sway. Following last year’s coup, Orano itself attempted to remain uninvolved in the diplomatic dispute, maintain a discreet presence, and continue its normal operations. However, the Ecowas trade embargo hindered its ability to export the production from the Somaïr mine, situated near Arlit in the Sahara Desert. Even after the sanctions were rescinded in late February, the customary uranium export pathway, through Benin’s port of Cotonou, stayed obstructed because the junta maintained the border closure amidst an ongoing political disagreement with Benin. Orano proposed airlifting the uranium, but the regime declined this proposition. In June, the junta revoked the French company’s entitlements to develop a new mine at the extensive Imouraren deposit, which had been regarded as the uranium sector’s primary new prospect for future expansion. Concurrently, the export impediment was driving Somaïr into a financial crisis; by November, the company held 1,150 tonnes of embargoed uranium concentrate stocks valued at $210 million (£165 million). When Orano opted to cease additional production and prioritize paying employee wages, its relationship with the government further deteriorated, culminating in an almost complete collapse this week. Naturally, not only the company but also Niger’s economy bears the cost of this predicament, through foregone export revenues and the jeopardy of hundreds of jobs. For Arlit and other communities in the northern desert, this would represent a severe setback, notwithstanding discussions of renewed operations at a Chinese mining venture in the area and some interest in the sector from other prospective collaborators. However, Niger’s junta perceives no necessity to offer concessions to Orano, as it is currently bolstered by a significant increase in oil exports, facilitated by a newly constructed Chinese pipeline. With this financial buffer, the regime seems willing to absorb the expenses associated with disrupting and likely dissolving the long-standing uranium partnership with France, which is now its primary international adversary.