Trump Declares Syria “Not Our Fight,” Yet Disengagement May Prove Challenging

While Donald Trump was in Paris last weekend, observing the renovated Notre Dame cathedral alongside global leaders, Islamist militants in Syria were simultaneously advancing towards Damascus in jeeps, completing the overthrow of the Assad government. During this period of contrasting global events, the US president-elect, positioned between the French first couple, remained attentive to the significant developments unfolding in the Middle East. On the same day, he shared on his Truth Social network: “Syria is a mess, but is not our friend.” He further stated: “THE UNITED STATES SHOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH IT. THIS IS NOT OUR FIGHT. LET IT PLAY OUT. DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” This message, along with a subsequent one the following day, underscored the president-elect’s strong directive against foreign policy intervention. It also prompted significant inquiries regarding future actions. Considering the conflict’s involvement and impact on both regional and international entities, is it truly feasible for Trump to maintain “nothing to do” with Syria now that President Bashar al-Assad’s administration has collapsed? Will Trump withdraw American forces? Does his approach significantly diverge from President Biden’s, and if so, what is the purpose of the White House undertaking any actions in the five weeks leading up to Trump’s inauguration? The present administration is engaged in intense diplomatic efforts following Assad’s downfall and the ascent of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a Syrian Islamist armed organization identified by the US as a terrorist group. This report is being written from Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s aircraft, as he travels between Jordan and Turkey, seeking support from crucial Arab and Muslim nations in the area for Washington’s prerequisites for acknowledging a future Syrian government. The US stipulates that this government must be transparent and inclusive, must not serve as a “base for terrorism,” must not pose a threat to Syria’s neighbors, and must eliminate all chemical and biological weapons stockpiles. Mike Waltz, Trump’s unconfirmed nominee for national security adviser, adheres to a singular guiding principle in his foreign policy. He informed Fox News this week that “President Trump was elected with an overwhelming mandate to not get the United States dug into any more Middle Eastern wars.” He proceeded to identify America’s “core interests” in the region as the Islamic State (IS) group, Israel, and “our Gulf Arab allies.” Waltz’s remarks concisely encapsulated Trump’s perspective on Syria, viewing it as a minor component within his broader regional policy framework. His objectives include ensuring the containment of remaining IS elements and preventing a future government in Damascus from posing a threat to Israel, Washington’s primary regional ally. Trump is additionally concentrating on what he considers the ultimate achievement: a landmark diplomatic and commercial agreement aimed at normalizing ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which he anticipates would further diminish and embarrass Iran. The remaining issues, Trump contends, constitute Syria’s “mess” to resolve internally. Trump’s statements recall his previous descriptions of Syria during his initial term, when he disparaged the nation—despite its remarkable cultural heritage spanning millennia—as a territory of “sand and death.” Robert Ford, who served as President Barack Obama’s ambassador to Syria from 2011-14 and advocated within that administration for increased American involvement through support for Syrian moderate opposition factions to oppose Assad’s harsh repression of his populace, stated: “Donald Trump, himself, I think really wanted very little to do with Syria during his first administration.” He informed the BBC that “But there are other people in his circle who are much more concerned about counterterrorism.” The US presently maintains approximately 900 troops in Syria, situated east of the Euphrates river and within a 55km (34 miles) “deconfliction” zone adjacent to Iraq and Jordan. Their stated objective is to combat the IS group, which is now significantly weakened in desert encampments, and to train and equip the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF – Kurdish and Arab partners of the US who govern the area). The SDF is also responsible for securing camps housing IS combatants and their relatives. In reality, the American ground presence has extended beyond this, contributing to the obstruction of a potential arms supply route for Iran, which utilized Syria to provision its ally Hezbollah. Mr. Ford, along with other experts, suggests that although Trump’s isolationist tendencies resonate positively on social media, the practical circumstances on the ground and the perspectives of his own staff might ultimately temper his position. This viewpoint is corroborated by Wa’el Alzayat, who previously served as an adviser on Syria at the US Department of State. He informed the BBC that “He is bringing on board some serious people to his administration who will be running his Middle East file,” particularly highlighting that Senator Marco Rubio, nominated for secretary of state, “is a serious foreign policy player.” These conflicting pressures—between isolationist principles and regional objectives—also intensified during his initial term, when Trump cut the remaining CIA funding for certain “moderate” rebels and commanded the pullout of US troops from northern Syria in 2019. At that juncture, Waltz labeled the action “a strategic mistake,” and Trump’s own staff, concerned about a potential IS resurgence, partially reversed his directive. Trump also deviated from his non-interventionist principles by firing 59 cruise missiles at a Syrian airfield in 2017, following allegations that Assad had ordered a chemical weapons assault that resulted in numerous civilian deaths. Furthermore, he intensified sanctions against Syria’s leadership. Waltz summarized the ambiguous nature of Trump’s “it’s not our fight” commitment. He stated to Fox News: “That doesn’t mean he’s not willing to absolutely step in.” He added: “President Trump has no problem taking decisive action if the American homeland is threatened in any way.” Another significant individual contributing to potential friction is Tulsi Gabbard, whom Trump has put forward as director of national intelligence. The contentious former Democrat, now an ally of Trump, encountered Assad in 2017 during a “fact-finding” mission and, at that time, expressed disapproval of Trump’s policies. Her nomination is anticipated to undergo rigorous examination by US senators amidst allegations—which she has refuted—of being an apologist for Assad and Russia. Concerns regarding the ongoing operation in Syria, and the aspiration to conclude it, are not unique to Trump. In January, three American service members lost their lives at a US installation in Jordan due to a drone attack carried out by Iran-supported militias active in Syria and Iraq, as the Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza risked wider regional escalation. This incident, among others, has consistently prompted inquiries for the Biden administration concerning the deployment and vulnerability of US forces in the territory. Indeed, the stances of the departing Biden and incoming Trump administrations concerning Syria exhibit more commonalities than divergences. Notwithstanding notable distinctions in their tone and discourse, both leaders desire a government in Damascus that aligns with US interests. Both Biden and Trump aim to capitalize on the perceived setbacks for Iran and Russia in Syria. Trump’s declaration, “this is not our fight, let it play out,” mirrors the Biden administration’s assertion that “this is a process that needs to be led by Syrians, not by the United States.” However, the “major” distinction, and the one causing the most apprehension among Biden’s supporters, lies in Trump’s stance regarding US ground troops and American support for the SDF, according to Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat in Washington who assisted opposition figures in escaping the Assad regime. He remarked: “Biden has more sympathy, connection, passion towards [the Kurds]. Historically, he was one of the first senators to visit the Kurdish areas [of northern Iraq] after Saddam Hussein’s Kuwait invasion.” “Trump and his people they don’t care as much… they take it into consideration not to leave their allies out, they get this, [but] the way they implement it is different.” Mr. Barabandi, who expressed support for Trump’s non-interventionist statements, anticipates that the president-elect will “for sure” withdraw US troops, but through a phased approach and with a well-defined strategy. He commented: “It will not be like Afghanistan, within 24 hours.” He added: “He will say within six months, or whatever time, a deadline for that and for the arrangement of everything.” A significant portion of future developments could hinge on Trump’s conversations with Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, with whom he is believed to share a strong rapport. US support for the SDF has consistently been a point of contention with Turkey, which considers the People’s Defense Units (YPG)—the Kurdish contingent forming the SDF’s primary military component—a terrorist organization. Following Assad’s collapse, Turkey has conducted airstrikes to dislodge Kurdish combatants from key regions, including the town of Manbij. Trump might seek to negotiate an agreement with his counterpart in Ankara that facilitates the withdrawal of US forces and potentially enhances Turkey’s influence. However, the prospect of Turkish-supported factions assuming authority over certain territories is a concern