The reinvention of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani: From jihadist figure to rebel political leader

Syrian rebel figure Abu Mohammed al-Jolani has ceased using his nom de guerre, which was linked to his jihadist history, and has instead adopted his actual name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official statements released since Thursday, preceding President Bashar al-Assad’s downfall. This action forms part of Jolani’s strategy to enhance his credibility within a changed environment, as his Islamist militant organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which heads other rebel groups, declares it has seized the Syrian capital, Damascus, thereby consolidating its authority across a significant portion of the nation. Jolani’s shift is not new; rather, it has been deliberately developed over an extended period, visible in his public declarations, discussions with global media, and changes in his personal presentation. Previously dressed in conventional jihadist militant clothing, he has transitioned to a more Western-influenced style of dress in recent years. Currently, while directing the offensive, he wears military fatigues, signifying his position as the operations room commander. However, who is Jolani—or Ahmed al-Sharaa—and what are the reasons and methods behind his transformation? An interview with Jolani by PBS in 2021 disclosed his birth in 1982 in Saudi Arabia, where his father was employed as an oil engineer until 1989. In that year, the Jolani family relocated back to Syria, where he spent his formative years and resided in Damascus’s Mezzeh neighborhood. Jolani’s involvement as a jihadist commenced in Iraq, connected to al-Qaeda via the forerunner of the Islamic State (IS) group—al-Qaeda in Iraq and subsequently, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). Following the 2003 US-led invasion, he joined other international combatants in Iraq and, in 2005, was incarcerated at Camp Bucca, where he strengthened his jihadist connections and was later acquainted with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the reserved academic who would eventually lead IS. During 2011, Baghdadi dispatched Jolani to Syria, providing funds to establish al-Nusra Front, a clandestine group linked to ISI. By 2012, Nusra had emerged as a significant Syrian combat organization, concealing its connections to IS and al-Qaeda. In 2013, friction developed when Baghdadi’s organization in Iraq independently announced the unification of the two entities (ISI and Nusra), proclaiming the formation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and for the first time, openly disclosing their interconnections. Jolani opposed this, aiming to separate his group from ISI’s aggressive methods, which resulted in a division. To resolve that difficult predicament, Jolani swore loyalty to al-Qaeda, thereby establishing Nusra Front as its Syrian affiliate. From its inception, he focused on gaining Syrian backing, differentiating himself from IS’s cruelty, and advocating a more practical strategy for jihad. By April 2013, al-Nusra Front had become al-Qaeda’s Syrian branch, placing it in opposition to IS. Although Jolani’s action was partly an endeavor to retain local backing and prevent alienating Syrians and rebel groups, the al-Qaeda association ultimately provided minimal advantage to this objective. This presented a significant difficulty in 2015 when Nusra and other groups seized Idlib province, compelling them to collaborate in its governance. During 2016, Jolani broke off relations with al-Qaeda, renaming the organization Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and subsequently Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017. While initially seeming superficial, this separation exposed more profound disagreements. Al-Qaeda charged Jolani with treachery, resulting in desertions and the establishment of Hurras al-Din, a new al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, which HTS subsequently suppressed in 2020. Nevertheless, Hurras al-Din members have maintained a discreet presence in the area. HTS additionally targeted IS operatives and international combatants in Idlib, dismantling their infrastructures and compelling some to participate in “deradicalisation” programs. These actions, presented as attempts to consolidate militant groups and lessen internal conflicts, indicated Jolani’s approach to establish HTS as a leading and politically sustainable power in Syria. Notwithstanding the public separation from al-Qaeda and the alterations in its name, HTS remained classified as a terrorist organization by the UN, US, UK, and other nations, and the US continued to offer a $10m reward for details regarding Jolani’s location. Western governments viewed the split as a superficial act. Under Jolani’s leadership, HTS emerged as the primary power in Idlib, the largest rebel stronghold in north-west Syria, housing approximately four million inhabitants, many of whom had been displaced from other Syrian regions. To alleviate worries about a militant organization administering the territory, HTS formed a civilian entity, the “Syrian Salvation Government” (SG), in 2017, serving as its political and administrative branch. The SG operated akin to a state, featuring a prime minister, various ministries, and local departments supervising areas like education, health, and reconstruction, all while upholding a religious council that adhered to Sharia, or Islamic law. In an effort to transform his public perception, Jolani actively interacted with the populace, visiting refugee camps, participating in gatherings, and supervising humanitarian aid operations, especially during emergencies such as the 2023 earthquakes. HTS emphasized accomplishments in administration and infrastructure to validate its governance and illustrate its capacity to deliver stability and services. It had previously commended the Taliban, following their return to power in 2021, praising them as a source of inspiration and an example for successfully reconciling jihadist endeavors with political ambitions, which included making strategic concessions to attain their objectives. Jolani’s initiatives in Idlib mirrored his wider approach to illustrate HTS’s capacity not only to engage in jihad but also to govern competently. By emphasizing stability, public amenities, and rebuilding, he sought to present Idlib as a successful example under HTS administration, thereby bolstering both his group’s legitimacy and his personal political ambitions. Nevertheless, under his command, HTS has suppressed and sidelined other militant groups, including both jihadist and rebel factions, in its pursuit of consolidating power and asserting dominance. For more than a year preceding the HTS-led rebel offensive on 27 November, Jolani encountered demonstrations in Idlib from both hardline Islamists and Syrian activists. Detractors likened his governance to Assad’s, alleging HTS of authoritarian practices, stifling opposition, and silencing critics. Demonstrators referred to HTS’s security forces as “Shabbiha”, a designation employed for Assad’s loyalist enforcers. They additionally claimed that HTS intentionally refrained from significant combat against government troops and marginalized jihadists and foreign combatants in Idlib to deter them from undertaking such activities, all with the aim of placating international entities. Even throughout the most recent offensive, activists have consistently called upon HTS to free individuals reportedly incarcerated in Idlib for voicing opposition. Addressing these criticisms, HTS implemented multiple reforms during the past year. It either dissolved or re-designated a contentious security unit implicated in human rights abuses and created a “Department of Grievances” to enable citizens to submit complaints against the organization. Its opponents asserted that these actions were merely for show, intended to curb dissent. To vindicate its power consolidation in Idlib and the suppression of diversity among militant organizations, HTS contended that unification under a singular leadership was essential for achieving advancement and ultimately deposing the Syrian government. HTS and its civilian component, the SG, navigated a delicate balance, endeavoring to present a contemporary, moderate image to appeal to both the local populace and the global community, while concurrently preserving their Islamist identity to appease hardliners within rebel-controlled territories and HTS’s own membership. For example, in December 2023, HTS and the SG encountered opposition following a “festival” hosted at a new, polished shopping mall, which hardliners condemned as “immoral”. Furthermore, this August, a ceremony inspired by the Paralympic Games elicited strong disapproval from hardliners, leading the SG to re-evaluate the planning of similar events. These occurrences highlight the difficulties HTS encounters in harmonizing the expectations of its Islamist foundation with the wider aspirations of the Syrian populace, who desire liberty and peaceful coexistence after prolonged authoritarian governance under Assad. As the most recent offensive progressed, international media concentrated on Jolani’s jihadist background, leading some rebel advocates to urge him to withdraw, perceiving him as a disadvantage. Despite his earlier indications of readiness to disband his group and relinquish his position, his recent conduct and public engagements convey an alternative narrative. HTS’s achievement in unifying rebel forces and almost seizing the entire nation in less than two weeks has solidified Jolani’s standing, silencing hardline detractors and allegations of opportunism. Jolani and the SG have subsequently offered assurances to both domestic and international audiences. To Syrians, including minority groups, they guaranteed security; to neighboring countries and powers such as Russia, they committed to peaceful interactions. Jolani even guaranteed Russia that its Syrian military installations would remain untouched if hostilities concluded. This change reflects HTS’s “moderate jihad” approach since 2017, prioritizing practical considerations over inflexible ideology. Jolani’s methodology might indicate the weakening of global jihadist movements such as IS and al-Qaeda, whose rigidity is progressively viewed as inefficient and untenable. His path could encourage other organizations to adjust, signifying either a new period of localized, politically adaptable “jihadism” or merely a transient deviation from the conventional course to achieve political and territorial advantages.