Syria’s £4.5bn Illegal Drug Empire: The Road Ahead

Following a rapid military offensive that traversed Syria and led to the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government, Syrian rebel leader Ahmed al-Sharaa delivered a victory address in Damascus. During this speech, a comment he made about an illicit narcotic, which has inundated the Middle East for the last decade, largely escaped attention. He stated, “Syria has become the biggest producer of Captagon on earth,” adding, “And today, Syria is going to be purified by the grace of God.” Captagon, an addictive, amphetamine-like tablet also known as “poor man’s cocaine,” is largely unfamiliar beyond the Middle East. Its manufacture has surged in Syria, a nation grappling with an economy devastated by conflict, sanctions, and the widespread exodus of its populace. Bordering nations’ authorities have faced significant challenges in managing the extensive smuggling of these pills across their frontiers. The World Bank estimated the annual value of Captagon’s illegal trade, for which Syria was identified as the primary source, at $5.6bn (£4.5bn). Given the massive scale of the pills’ production and distribution, it was suspected that this operation transcended mere criminal gang activity, suggesting an industry directed by the regime itself. Several weeks after al-Sharaa’s address (he was formerly known by his nom de guerre, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani), compelling visuals have surfaced, indicating the accuracy of these suspicions. Videos recorded by Syrians during raids on properties purportedly belonging to Assad’s relatives depict rooms filled with pills undergoing manufacturing and packaging, concealed within counterfeit industrial goods. Additional footage displays large quantities of pills discovered at what seems to be a Syrian military airbase, subsequently ignited by rebel forces. For a BBC World Service documentary, I dedicated a year to researching Captagon, observing its widespread appeal among affluent young individuals in Gulf nations such as Saudi Arabia, as well as among the working class in countries like Jordan. Yasser, a young male addict at a rehabilitation clinic in Amman, Jordan’s capital, recounted, “I was 19 years old, I started taking Captagon and my life started to fall apart.” He added, “I started hanging out with people who take this thing. You work, you live without food, so the body is a wreck.” A key question arises: how will al-Sharaa and his organization, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), address the substantial population of Captagon addicts in Syria and across the Middle East who might abruptly lose access to their supply? Caroline Rose, a Syrian drug trafficking expert at the New Lines Institute, expressed reservations regarding this situation. She stated, “My fear is that they will really crack down on supply and not necessarily try to do any sort of demand reduction.” Furthermore, a more extensive issue is present: what economic impact will the cessation of this highly profitable trade have on Syria? And with the original perpetrators removed, how will al-Sharaa prevent other criminal elements from stepping in to fill the void? The widespread distribution of Captagon escalated the situation in the Middle East to a veritable narco-war. While documenting operations with the Jordanian army along their desert boundary with Syria, we observed soldiers strengthening their fences and heard accounts of colleagues who had died in confrontations with Captagon smugglers. The Jordanian forces alleged that Syrian soldiers across the border were assisting these smugglers. Other nations in the region have expressed similar alarm regarding this trade. For a period, Saudi Arabia halted fruit and vegetable imports from Lebanon after authorities repeatedly discovered shipping containers of produce, such as pomegranates, that had been hollowed out and packed with bags of Captagon pills. Our investigation involved filming in five countries, encompassing both areas of Syria controlled by the regime and those held by rebels. We consulted informed sources and obtained access to confidential court documents from cases in Germany and Lebanon. Our findings allowed us to identify two principal entities involved in the trade: Assad’s extended family and the Syrian armed forces, specifically its Fourth Division, which is commanded by Assad’s brother, Maher. Maher al-Assad was arguably the most influential figure in Syria, second only to his brother. Numerous Western powers imposed sanctions on him due to the brutality he inflicted upon protesters during the 2011 pro-democracy uprising, an event that triggered the devastating civil war. Additionally, the French judiciary has issued an international arrest warrant for both him and his brother, citing their alleged involvement in chemical weapons assaults in Syria in 2013. By accessing the WhatsApp conversations of a Captagon dealer incarcerated in Lebanon, we were able to link Maher al-Assad’s Fourth Division and his deputy, General Ghassan Bilal, to the illicit activities. This disclosure represented a significant achievement in corroborating the involvement of Syria’s armed forces and Bashar al-Assad’s close associates in the trade. Observing recent footage of disheartened Syrian army personnel retreating without resistance as rebel forces advanced, I recalled an interview conducted last year with a regime soldier. He informed us that his monthly army salary of $30 (£24) was insufficient to cover his family’s food for even three days, which led his unit to engage in criminal activities and Captagon trade. He stated, “It’s what brings most of the money now.” In May 2023, the Arab League voted to reinstate Syria, 12 years after its expulsion for brutally suppressing a popular uprising. This was perceived as a diplomatic triumph for Assad, who utilized pledges to address the Captagon trade as a means to achieve rehabilitation. Currently, as Syria’s rebel leadership solidifies control over state institutions, they appear to recognize the favorable messages conveyed to cautious neighboring countries through their commitments to curb the Captagon trade. However, extricating the nation from a profitable criminal enterprise, after years of state encouragement, could prove to be a more formidable challenge. Issam Al Reis, a former major engineer in the Syrian army who defected at the outset of the uprising against the Assad regime, has dedicated time to researching the Captagon trade. He posited that HTS would not require extensive effort to halt the trade initially, stating, “because the main players have left” and a significant decline in Captagon exports has already occurred. Nevertheless, he cautioned that “new guys” could be poised to assume control. This situation will become especially challenging if the demand aspect is not also addressed. According to Ms. Rose, there is scant evidence of investment in rehabilitation efforts during HTS’s control of Idlib province in north-west Syria. She remarked, “[There was a] very poor picture for trying to address Captagon consumption.” She further noted a pre-existing increase in the trafficking of a different drug through Syria. She predicted, “I think many users will seek out crystal meth as an alternative, especially users who have already established a tolerance to Captagon and need something that’s a bit more strong.” Another issue, as highlighted by Mr. Al Reis, is financial. He articulated it by saying: “Syrians need the money.” He expressed hope that the international community would assist in deterring individuals from engaging in the drug trade by providing humanitarian aid and relaxing sanctions. Conversely, Ms. Rose contended that the new leadership must pinpoint “new and alternative economic pathways to encourage Syrians to participate in the licit formal economy.” She concluded that while the primary figures have departed, numerous individuals involved in the drug’s production and smuggling persist within the nation. She added, “And old habits die hard.”