Syrian Rebels Target Damascus and Assad

Recent days have seen an extraordinary and rapid reversal of the existing situation in Syria, despite its previous unresolved and unsatisfactory state. Syrian government representatives and their supporters continued to affirm that the army would maintain its position in Hama, even as insurgent combatants were penetrating the city. Soon after, the Syrian military confirmed its withdrawal from Hama, thereby relinquishing control of the city to rebel groups for the first time. Following the capture of two significant cities within a single week, the next objective for the insurgents, spearheaded by the Islamist organization Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is Homs. In anticipation of what appears to be the forthcoming major confrontation, tens of thousands of individuals are evacuating the city. The implications have escalated sharply for President Bashar al-Assad and his primary supporters, Russia and Iran. Homs holds substantially greater strategic importance compared to both Aleppo and Hama. It is situated at a critical crossroads, providing access westward to the core region of support for the Assad family and southward towards the capital city, Damascus. Regardless of HTS’s prior strategy, which involved years spent establishing its power base in the north-western province of Idlib, the impetus of the last week now appears to be driving inevitably towards a direct confrontation with Assad’s ongoing governance. HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani affirmed in an interview with CNN that “the rebels do indeed aim to overthrow the Assad regime”. Consequently, scrutiny is now directed towards the Syrian leader’s ability to repel this renewed effort to remove him from authority. The Syrian army, predominantly composed of conscripts, might have been defeated years prior had external forces not intervened to support Assad. Soldiers receive insufficient pay, lack adequate equipment, and frequently suffer from low morale, with desertion being a persistent problem. Following his military’s failure to retain Aleppo and subsequently Hama, Assad mandated a 50% increase in soldiers’ salaries, though this measure alone is improbable to alter the course of events. Russian aircraft provided support to Syrian forces in Hama, yet evidently not with sufficient intensity to be decisive. The absence of comprehensive Russian military backing has prompted conjecture that Moscow might possess a reduced capacity to exert the transformative influence it demonstrated in Syria in 2015. This diminished capacity is potentially attributable to nearly three years of conflict in Ukraine, which has depleted its reserves of personnel and military equipment. Nevertheless, Russia retains powerful motivations to persist in its support for Assad. President Putin’s resolute, full-scale military intervention, which sustained the Syrian leader in power when he faced imminent defeat, underscored the inability of Western allies, particularly the US, to fulfill their pledges of assistance to the rebels. The naval base Russia has operated for decades in the Syrian port of Tartus provides Moscow with its sole military center in the Mediterranean. Should the insurgents succeed in capturing Homs, this could potentially create a path towards the Syrian coast, thereby jeopardizing the base. It remains improbable that Russia would not perceive a political and strategic necessity to redirect its military strength against the rebels to maintain Assad’s authority, even if he were to control only a reduced portion of Syria, significantly smaller than the 60% he presently governs. Another significant area of uncertainty pertains to Iran and the militias it has supported, including Hezbollah, along with the military expertise it has furnished, which collectively represent the other vital component in sustaining Assad’s rule. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem, who assumed leadership following Israel’s assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, has affirmed that the organization will support the Syrian government, opposing what he characterized as “jihadist aggression orchestrated by the US and Israel”. Nevertheless, with its command structure severely weakened and its combatants still reorganizing after Israel’s recent ground and air offensive against the group in Lebanon, Hezbollah may not possess the same level of power it exhibited when it engaged Syrian rebel factions on the front lines. Despite this, it clearly remains dedicated to its role, as security sources in Lebanon and Syria indicate that elite Hezbollah forces have entered Syria and established positions in Homs. Regarding Tehran, it currently appears to be gradually disengaging from both direct and proxy conflicts within the region, a departure from its considerably more assertive strategy of recent years. This shift might curtail its inclination for the extensive military assistance to Assad that it has previously supplied. Speculation has arisen concerning the potential involvement of Iranian-backed militias from Iraq, but both the Iraqi government and Moqtada al-Sadr, one of the most influential Shia leaders, have issued warnings against such intervention. Assad’s prospects for political endurance will hinge not solely on the capacities of his armed forces and principal allies, but also on the existing fragmentation among the diverse groups opposing him. Beyond HTS and the factions originating from Idlib, other adversaries include the Kurdish-led forces in the north-east, the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army in the north, and numerous other entities that maintain a degree of influence in various parts of the nation. Among these is the Islamic State (IS) group, which might capitalize on the current conflict to attempt to expand its control beyond the remote desert areas where it still retains a foothold. The inability of rebel factions to coalesce was a pivotal element in Assad’s past political survival. He and his adherents will be anticipating a similar outcome in the present circumstances. Presently, backing for the Syrian president, perceived as the least undesirable option, appears to endure among several minority communities, including naturally the Assad family’s own minority Alawite sect. These groups apprehend the takeover of their localities by what they consider a jihadist entity. While HTS may have disavowed its former association with al-Qaeda, numerous observers continue to regard it as an extremist organization. Ultimately, Assad’s destiny appears most probable to be determined by the choices made by the principal external actors in Syria. Russia, Iran, and Turkey have previously reached accords concerning conflict areas in Syria, most notably in Idlib four years prior; however, the swift and unexpected intensification of the situation in Syria may have caught them all unprepared. They might soon be compelled to re-evaluate and make a determination regarding what best serves their respective interests—a Syria with Assad or one without him.