Syria Confronts Major Shift Following Assad’s Unexpected Collapse

The Assad government ultimately proved to be so weak, dishonest, and deteriorated that its downfall occurred in under two weeks. The swiftness of the regime’s disintegration has surprised everyone consulted. The situation was distinct in the spring of 2011, during the period of the Arab uprisings, as Syrians attempted to embrace the revolutionary fervor that had unseated the leaders of Tunisia and Egypt and posed a threat to the long-standing authoritarian rulers of Libya and Yemen. By 2011, the administration established by Hafez al-Assad and inherited by his son Bashar upon his passing in 2000 was already characterized by corruption and decay. Nevertheless, the framework Hafez constructed retained a considerable degree of the brutal, unyielding power he deemed essential for governing Syria. Assad senior had taken control in a nation susceptible to coups and successfully handed it over to his son and successor without facing substantial opposition. In 2011, Bashar al-Assad reverted to his father’s strategies. While difficult to conceive today, at that time, he possessed greater credibility among certain segments of Syria’s populace compared to the veteran dictators overthrown by throngs chanting the year’s rallying cry – “The people want the fall of the regime”. Bashar al-Assad openly backed the Palestinians and of Hezbollah during its effective conflict against Israel in the 2006 Lebanon war. He was younger than the former and soon-to-be former Arab heads of state. Following his father’s demise, he had consistently pledged reform. Some Syrians in 2011 still wished to trust him, anticipating that protests would provide the impetus he required for the promised transformation, until he commanded his forces to fatally shoot peaceful protestors in the streets. A former British ambassador to Syria once conveyed that comprehending the Assad government necessitated viewing Mafia movies such as The Godfather. Those who complied could receive rewards. Any individual opposing the family patriarch or his most trusted subordinates would be removed. In the Syrian context, this could involve execution by hanging, a firing squad, or perpetual imprisonment in subterranean cells. Currently, these individuals are being observed, gaunt and pallid, adjusting to the light, captured on the mobile phones of the insurgent combatants who have liberated thousands of them after years of confinement. The fragility of the regime, to the extent that it disintegrated akin to a damp paper bag, was concealed by the formidable and oppressive prison system it continued to operate. The global agreement held that Bashar al-Assad was feeble, reliant on Russia and Iran, and governing a nation he had fragmented to maintain his family’s authority – yet sufficiently robust to be considered an established element of the Middle East, potentially even beneficial. During the final period before insurgents emerged from Idlib, it was extensively reported that the US, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates were endeavoring to separate Assad’s Syria from Iran. Israel had been conducting progressively intense airstrikes against sites within Syria, which it asserted were components of the logistics network Iran utilized to deliver armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon had inflicted significant damage on Hezbollah, but the objective was to prevent its resurgence. Concurrently, the UAE and the US were attempting to identify inducements for him to sever ties with Tehran, by easing sanctions and facilitating Assad’s ongoing international reintegration. Both Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden have asserted responsibility for the collapse of the Assad government. There is validity to this claim. The harm Israel caused to Hezbollah and Iran, facilitated by US weaponry and continuous backing, coupled with Biden’s provision of arms to Ukraine, rendered it unfeasible, and even unappealing, for Assad’s primary supporters to intervene on his behalf. However, the circumstance that they considered Assad an element of their approach to restrict and undermine Iran up until days prior to his downfall distinctly suggests that they did not, for an instant, anticipate him being mere days from an abrupt escape to Russia. Their actions did play a role in his demise, though more inadvertently than intentionally. The collapse of the government could potentially terminate Iran’s logistical network, should Syria’s incoming leaders determine that their agreements with other parties hold greater utility than the Iranian partnership. All parties are intensely deliberating and re-evaluating the subsequent developments, and it remains premature to formulate definitive judgments. Syrians, their neighboring countries, and the global community are presently encountering another geopolitical upheaval, the most significant in the sequence that commenced after the Hamas assaults on Israel in October last year. This may not be the final one. Iran is witnessing the ultimate disintegration of the primary pillars of the network it designated as the “axis of resistance”. Its most crucial constituents have undergone alteration; Hezbollah has sustained severe damage, and the Assad government has ceased to exist. Iran’s leadership may consider pursuing indications of negotiations for an agreement with Donald Trump should he assume office. Alternatively, its newfound strategic vulnerability could compel it towards a momentous choice to convert its highly enriched uranium into a nuclear weapon. Syrians possess ample cause for celebration. In the period following 2011, notwithstanding the regime’s oppression and cruelty, Assad and his supporters were still able to enlist individuals willing to combat. Numerous soldiers encountered on the front lines conveyed that Assad represented a superior alternative to the jihadist extremists of the Islamic State group. In 2024, confronted by a well-structured insurgent contingent that asserted its identity as nationalist and Islamist, yet no longer jihadist, the army’s unwilling conscripts declined to engage in combat, shed their uniforms, and returned to their residences. The most favorable outcome is for Syrians, aided by prominent regional actors, to discover a method for fostering a post-conflict atmosphere of national unity, rather than a surge of plunder and retribution that would plunge the nation into renewed conflict. Abu Mohammad al Joulani, the head of the triumphant HTS, has urged his fighters and all of Syria’s religious communities to show mutual respect. His forces have dismantled the government, and he represents the closest figure Syria has to an unofficial leader. However, Syria contains numerous armed factions that do not necessarily concur with him and will seek to seize control in their respective territories. In southern Syria, tribal militias had not acknowledged the authority of the Assads. They will not adhere to directives they disapprove of from the new administration in Damascus. In the eastern desert region, the US identified a sufficient threat from residual elements of the Islamic State group to initiate multiple waves of aerial bombardments. The Israelis, apprehensive about the possibility of an Islamist state emerging on their frontier, are targeting the military installations of Syria’s armed forces. A more advisable approach might involve integrating a restructured Syrian Arab Army into the resolution for a nation largely devoid of legal governance. The imprudent choice by the US in 2003 to disband the Iraqi armed forces resulted in catastrophic repercussions. In Turkey, President Erdogan is likely content with the unfolding events. Erdogan’s Turkey exerted greater effort than any other power to safeguard the self-governance of Idlib province, where HTS was evolving into a combat-ready entity while Syria appeared to be in a state of stagnation. Erdogan may perceive his influence extending to Israel’s boundaries, at a juncture when Israel-Turkey relations have been adversely affected by the conflict in Gaza. The most dire prospect for Syrians is that their nation will emulate the trajectory of two Arab authoritarian states that descended into violent disorder subsequent to the collapse of their governments. Colonel Gaddafi of Libya and Saddam Hussein of Iraq were deposed without an immediate successor prepared to take control. Poorly conceived foreign involvement significantly contributed to two disasters. The void created by the dictators was subsequently occupied by surges of plunder, retaliation, power seizures, and civil strife. For multiple generations, Syrians have not controlled their own fate. Individuals were deprived of this autonomy by the two Assad presidents and their adherents. The nation forfeited its agency after conflict rendered it so debilitated that more powerful foreign entities exploited it to enhance and safeguard their own influence. Syrians continue to lack control over their personal lives. They could potentially establish a novel and improved nation if such agency were present. For individuals from Syria, what is your response to the country’s recent occurrences? Please share your views here or by using the form provided below. Copyright 2024 BBC. All rights reserved. The BBC does not assume accountability for the material found on external websites. Information regarding our external linking policy is available.