Former Russian Officer Discloses Details of Nuclear Base Operations and Wartime Alert

Anton, a former officer in the Russian nuclear forces, stated that the nuclear weapons base where he was stationed was placed on full combat alert on the day of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. He recounted, “Before that, we had only exercises. But on the day the war started, the weapons were fully in place.” Anton added, “We were ready to launch the forces into the sea and air and, in theory, carry out a nuclear strike.” The BBC met Anton at an undisclosed location outside Russia. To ensure his safety, the BBC has chosen not to disclose his whereabouts, altered his name, and refrained from showing his face. Anton served as an officer at a highly classified nuclear weapons facility within Russia. He provided documents to the BBC that confirmed his unit, rank, and base. While the BBC could not independently corroborate every event Anton described, his account aligns with official Russian statements made concurrently. For instance, three days after Russian forces entered Ukraine, Vladimir Putin declared that Russia’s nuclear deterrence forces had been commanded into a “special mode of combat service.” Anton asserted that this combat alert was active from the first day of the war, claiming his unit was “shut inside the base.” The former officer stated, “All we had was Russian state TV,” adding, “I didn’t really know what it all meant. I automatically carried out my duties. We weren’t fighting in the war, we were just guarding the nuclear weapons.” He further indicated that the alert status was lifted after a period of two to three weeks. Anton’s testimony provides a rare glimpse into the highly confidential internal operations of Russia’s nuclear forces, as it is exceedingly uncommon for military personnel to communicate with journalists. He elaborated on the recruitment process, stating, “There is a very strict selection process there. Everyone is a professional soldier – no conscripts.” He continued, “There are constant checks and lie-detector tests for everyone. The pay is much higher, and the troops aren’t sent to war. They’re there to either repel, or carry out, a nuclear strike.” The former officer described a rigorously controlled environment. He explained, “It was my responsibility to ensure the soldiers under me didn’t take any phones on to the nuclear base.” He characterized the base as “a closed society, there are no strangers there.” He added that for parents to visit, “you need to submit a request to the FSB Security Service three months in advance.” Anton was a member of the base’s security unit, a rapid-reaction force tasked with guarding the nuclear weapons. He stated, with a discernible hint of pride, “We had constant training exercises. Our reaction time was two minutes.” According to the Federation of American Scientists, Russia possesses approximately 4,380 operational nuclear warheads, with only 1,700 of these being “deployed” or prepared for immediate use. The combined total of all Nato member states’ nuclear warheads is comparable. Concerns also persist regarding the potential for Putin to opt for the deployment of “non-strategic,” frequently referred to as tactical, nuclear weapons. These are smaller missiles that typically do not result in extensive radioactive fallout, yet their deployment would still precipitate a perilous escalation of the conflict. The Kremlin has consistently sought to challenge the resolve of Western nations. Just last week, Putin approved amendments to Russia’s nuclear doctrine, which outlines the official regulations governing the launch of nuclear weapons. The revised doctrine now permits Russia to launch if it faces a “massive attack” involving conventional missiles from a non-nuclear state, provided this occurs “with the participation or support of a nuclear state.” Russian officials assert that the updated doctrine “effectively eliminates” the prospect of Russia’s defeat on the battlefield. However, questions arise regarding the full functionality of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Some Western experts have posited that many of its weapons are relics from the Soviet era and may no longer be operational. The former nuclear forces officer dismissed this perspective as a “very simplified view from so-called experts.” He elaborated, “There might be some old-fashioned types of weapons in some areas, but the country has an enormous nuclear arsenal, a huge amount of warheads, including constant combat patrol on land, sea and air.” He insisted that Russia’s nuclear weapons were fully operational and prepared for battle. He stated, “The work to maintain the nuclear weapons is carried out constantly, it never stops even for one minute.” Soon after the full-scale conflict commenced, Anton recounted receiving what he termed a “criminal order”: to deliver lectures to his troops based on highly specific written directives. He exclaimed, “They said that Ukrainian civilians are combatants and should be destroyed!” He continued, “That’s a red line for me – it’s a war crime. I said I won’t spread this propaganda.” As a consequence, senior officers disciplined Anton by reassigning him to a standard assault brigade located in a different region of the country, informing him that he would be deployed to the war. Such units are frequently dispatched into combat as the “first wave,” and several Russian deserters have informed the BBC that individuals deemed “troublemakers” for opposing the war have been utilized as “cannon fodder.” The Russian embassy in London did not provide a response when asked for comment. Prior to his potential deployment to the front line, Anton signed a declaration refusing participation in the war, which led to the initiation of a criminal case against him. He presented documents verifying his transfer to the assault brigade and particulars of the criminal proceedings. Subsequently, he chose to escape the country with assistance from a volunteer organization dedicated to aiding deserters. He remarked, “If I had run away from the nuclear forces base, then the local FSB Security Service would’ve reacted decisively and I probably wouldn’t have been able to leave the country.” However, he holds the belief that his transfer to a regular assault brigade caused the high-level security clearance system to falter. Anton expressed his desire for global awareness that numerous Russian soldiers oppose the war. The volunteer organization “Idite Lesom” (which translates to ‘Go by the Forest’ or ‘Get Lost’), which assists deserters, informed the BBC that the monthly number of deserters seeking aid has increased to 350. The dangers faced by those who flee are also escalating. At least one deserter has been killed after escaping abroad, and multiple instances have been recorded of men being forcibly repatriated to Russia and subjected to trial. Despite Anton’s departure from Russia, he stated that security services continue to search for him within the country. He noted, “I take precautions here, I work off the books and I don’t show up in any official systems.” He mentioned that he has ceased communication with his acquaintances at the nuclear base to avoid endangering them, explaining, “They must take lie-detector tests, and any contact with me could lead to a criminal case.” Nevertheless, he remains fully aware of the personal risk involved in assisting other soldiers to flee. He acknowledged, “I understand the more I do that, the higher the chances they could try and kill me.” Copyright 2024 BBC. All rights reserved. The BBC disclaims responsibility for the content of external sites. Information regarding its approach to external linking is available.