Former North Korean Soldiers Caution Against Underestimating Troops Deployed to Russia

Haneul’s most vivid memory from his service in the North Korean military is the constant, severe hunger. He experienced a 10kg weight loss during his initial month, sustained by a diet primarily consisting of cracked corn and spoiled cabbage. After three months of training, he recounts that nearly his entire battalion suffered from severe malnutrition, necessitating their transfer to a recovery facility to regain weight. Upon their subsequent deployment as front-line guards to the South Korean border, their diet shifted from corn to rice. However, by the time the rice reached their rations, a significant portion had been diverted by rear units, and the remainder was adulterated with sand. Haneul states that his unit received better provisions than most, a strategy intended to deter defections to South Korea, yet it ultimately failed to prevent his own. In 2012, Haneul undertook a perilous escape across the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ), the land strip separating North and South Korea. His experiences, along with those of other military defectors, offer insights into the conditions of thousands of North Korean soldiers now deployed to the front lines of Russia’s conflict with Ukraine. Pyongyang has reportedly dispatched approximately 11,000 troops to assist Russian forces in retaking parts of its Kursk region, which Ukraine seized during a surprise summer offensive. Earlier this week, Seoul, Washington, and Kyiv announced that these soldiers had entered combat “in significant numbers” and reported initial casualties. South Korean officials estimate that over 100 have already been killed and more injured, though this figure remains unconfirmed. Nevertheless, defectors and other military specialists have advised the BBC that these forces should not be underestimated. According to South Korean intelligence, most of these troops belong to the elite Storm Corps unit, possessing “high morale” but “lack an understanding of contemporary warfare.” Defector Lee Hyun Seung, who trained North Korea’s special forces in the early 2000s before his defection in 2014, notes that only taller, more athletic men are selected for the Storm Corps. He instructed them in martial arts, knife throwing, and crafting weapons from cutlery and other kitchen implements. Despite the Storm Corps receiving more advanced training than regular North Korean units, their soldiers continue to be underfed and even malnourished. Haneul observes that online videos, purportedly showing these troops in Russia, depict younger, “frail” soldiers. This starkly contrasts with Pyongyang’s propaganda films, which portray men breaking iron chains and shattering ice blocks with their bare hands. Throughout his military career, Haneul recalls firing only three bullets during a single live-fire training session. His closest encounter with actual combat occurred when a hungry farmer inadvertently entered the DMZ searching for vegetables. Haneul states he disregarded orders to “shoot any intruders” and allowed the man to leave with a warning. Assessing the extent of changes in North Korea since Haneul’s defection a decade ago is challenging due to limited information. It appears that the nation’s leader, Kim Jong Un, has prioritized allocating his scarce resources to missiles and nuclear weapons over his conventional army. However, another soldier, Ryu Seonghyun, who defected in 2019, asserts that the initial three years in the military are “incredibly tough,” even for special forces personnel. The 28-year-old, who served seven years as a driver in the air force, noted a deterioration of conditions during his service, with rice progressively disappearing from meals. “The soldiers are sent into the mountains for days with a small amount of rice, and are told it is part of their survival training.” Given that these troops are trained for combat in the mountainous Korean Peninsula, defectors question their adaptability to fighting on the flat terrain and in the trenches of Kursk. Crucially, the Storm Corps is not designed as a front-line unit. “Their mission is to infiltrate enemy lines and create chaos deep within enemy territory,” Ryu explains. He adds that Kim Jong Un had no alternative but to deploy special forces, as regular soldiers spend most of their time engaged in farming, construction, or wood chopping. “Kim Jong Un had to send men who could demonstrate at least a certain level of combat ability, to avoid damaging North Korea’s reputation in Russia.” The language barrier appears to have introduced an additional obstacle. On Sunday, Ukraine’s defence intelligence unit reported that communication difficulties led to North Korean soldiers accidentally firing on a Russian battalion, resulting in eight fatalities. Considering these assessments, it might be tempting to dismiss these troops as “cannon fodder” and an indication of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s desperation. However, defectors warn that this would be a misjudgment, emphasizing that their loyalty to the regime and fighting spirit will be significant. “Most of the soldiers in the Storm Corps come from working-class or farming families, who are highly obedient to the party and will follow orders unquestionably,” states Haneul, whose father and cousin were also in special forces. Lee adds that intense, ideological “brainwashing” sessions conducted every morning will further ensure their mental preparedness. He believes the North Korean troops “will become accustomed to the battlefield, learn how to fight the enemy, and find ways to survive.” Although the soldiers were not given a choice regarding their deployment, Ryu speculates that many may have desired to go. He suggests that ambitious individuals would view it as a chance to advance their careers. Furthermore, given the harsh conditions of service in North Korea, some might have welcomed the opportunity to experience life abroad for the first time. “I think they’ll be more willing to fight than Russian troops,” he adds, conceding that in their circumstances, he too would have wished for deployment. Chun In-bum, a former commander of South Korea’s special forces, concurs with the defectors’ evaluations. “Just because they lack food and training, does not mean they are incapable. They will acclimatise quickly. We should not underestimate them.” While 11,000 troops are unlikely to alter the course of such an attritional conflict—with Russia estimated to be incurring over a thousand casualties daily—experts and officials believe this could be merely the initial contingent. Pyongyang potentially could deploy up to 60,000 or even 100,000 soldiers if they are rotated. At these numbers, Mr. Chun believes they could prove effective. Moreover, former soldiers indicate that Kim Jong Un can absorb substantial losses without jeopardizing his regime’s stability. “Those who have been sent will be men without influence or connections – to put it bluntly, those who can be sacrificed without issue,” Haneul explains. He recalls his shock upon realizing that his front-line unit contained no children of high-ranking parents: “That’s when I realised we were expendable.” He anticipates minimal resistance from the families of the deceased, whose sons, he says, will be honored as heroes. “There are countless parents who have lost a child after sending them to the military,” he adds, recounting the death of his second cousin, whose aunt received a certificate commending her son’s heroic contribution. The strong loyalty of the soldiers and their families could diminish Ukrainian and South Korean hopes that many will simply defect once engaged in combat. Kyiv and Seoul have discussed implementing psychological operations along the front line to encourage surrenders. However, it appears these troops lack access to mobile phones. According to Ukrainian intelligence, even Russian soldiers’ phones are confiscated before they encounter North Korean forces. Consequently, potential infiltration strategies include broadcasting messages via loudspeakers or using drones to distribute leaflets. Both Ryu and Haneul decided to defect after encountering anti-regime propaganda sent across the border from South Korea. Yet, they express doubt that such methods would be effective so far from their homeland. They explain that developing the desire and courage to defect requires considerable time. Furthermore, Haneul suspects that officers will have received orders to shoot any soldier attempting to flee. He remembers his comrades opening fire as he made his daring sprint across the DMZ. “Twelve bullets flew just a metre over my head,” he recounts. Capturing North Korean troops may also present a challenge for Ukraine. In North Korea, being a prisoner of war is considered profoundly shameful and worse than death. Instead, soldiers are instructed to take their own lives, either by shooting themselves or detonating a grenade. Ryu recalls a well-known military song titled “Save the Last Bullet.” “They tell you to save two bullets, one to shoot the enemy and one to shoot yourself.” Nevertheless, Lee, the former special forces trainer, is committed to assisting. He has volunteered to go to the front line to communicate directly with the soldiers. “It’s unlikely they will defect in large numbers, but we have to try. Hearing familiar voices like mine, and others from North Korea, might impact their psychology,” he states. Haneul’s sole hope is for their safe return to North Korea. He acknowledges the possibility that some of his relatives are among the troops dispatched to aid Russia. “I just hope they make it through and return safely.” Additional reporting by Jake Kwon and Hosu Lee. Copyright 2024 BBC. All rights reserved. The BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites. Read about our approach to external linking.