Donald Trump’s Unorthodox Approach: Prospects and Risks for Africa

Anticipating the choices of US President-elect Donald Trump upon his re-entry to the White House presents a challenge. However, a constant is expected to be his aversion to measured, principle-driven diplomacy for achieving peace, favoring instead deal-making and popular actions. This approach creates both potential advantages and dangers across various regions in Africa. A decade prior, the Obama administration collaborated with the African Union (AU) to revise United Nations (UN) regulations concerning the financing of peacekeepers, aiming to establish a stable financial foundation for African operations. The AU Commission, in conjunction with the UN and other international organizations, developed an “African peace and security architecture.” This framework encompassed proactive diplomatic measures to prevent impending conflicts, coordinated mediation initiatives, and peacekeeping deployments, all grounded in the standards and tenets stipulated by the UN Charter and the AU Constitutive Act. That period now feels distant. Initiatives for stronger peacekeeping efforts dissolved during the shift to the initial Trump administration. Subsequently, no new peacekeeping missions under the UN or AU have received authorization. Multiple missions, such as those in Darfur, Sudan, and Mali, have been terminated, and others have seen their scope reduced. The Biden administration did not alter this ongoing pattern. The concept of “liberal peace”—which posits that peace, democracy, justice, and open markets are interconnected—had historically been a significant component of US global strategy. While the AU adopted its multilateral aspect, it resisted admonishments regarding human rights and democracy, and its members held differing views on Western military actions, like those in Libya. Certain African leaders found Trump’s straightforwardness and emphasis on outcomes more appealing. The “Trump Doctrine” for the Middle East and Africa superseded multilateral approaches, instead prioritizing transactional agreements with American allies including Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and notably, Israel. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed formulated the strategy behind the Abraham Accords, with Trump taking credit as Arab nations joined. Additional consistent stances held by Trump included opposition to China’s growing influence in Africa and a disinclination to deploy American military personnel. Following a request from Egypt’s President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi—whom Trump characterized as “my favourite dictator”—then-Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin assumed responsibility for mediating the disagreement between Egypt and Ethiopia regarding the Nile waters. The immediate concern revolved around the volume of water the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam would hold as it neared completion. When negotiations stalled, Washington intervened decisively, halting aid to Ethiopia, while Trump remarked that Egypt could potentially “blow up” the dam. The United States acknowledged Morocco’s sovereignty claim over Western Sahara in return for Rabat’s endorsement of the Abraham Accords, which included recognizing Israel. During the period of “liberal peace,” a resolution to civil conflict typically entailed the creation of a democratic constitution, coupled with provisions for disarming and demobilizing opposing forces, implementing transitional justice and reconciliation, and establishing aid-supported initiatives to provide peace benefits to the affected population. The initial Trump administration favored direct negotiations, where authoritarian leaders concluded private agreements. Academics refer to this approach as the “illiberal peace.” Upon then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s visit to Sudan following the popular uprising that resulted in the removal of military-Islamist leader Omar al-Bashir, his primary objective was a straightforward exchange: the United States would remove sanctions once Sudan consented to sign the Abraham Accords. In October 2020, the White House declared that President Trump had “brokered a historic peace agreement” between Israel and Sudan. Coming shortly after agreements with Bahrain and the UAE, and mere weeks before American citizens cast their votes in the presidential election, this event constituted Trump’s “October surprise.” It occurred too late to rescue Sudan from the economic downturn that undermined its democratic transition and subsequently dissipated after Trump’s defeat to Joe Biden. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to anticipate that a second Trump administration would maintain this trajectory. The precise alliances and agreements remain unforeseeable, with significant influence resting on those appointed to crucial roles. However, the concept of “liberal peace” is now defunct. Sudan presently faces Africa’s most extensive conflict and its most severe famine in decades. There is no indication of concern from Trump regarding this situation. The primary impediment to peace stems from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) providing weapons and financial support to one faction, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia endorse the opposing side. Peace remains unattainable as long as this dynamic persists. For these influential Arab actors, Sudan represents merely a single component within their broader geostrategic considerations, positioned beneath issues like Israel-Palestine, Iran, and their relationship with Washington. Should a realignment of Middle Eastern political dynamics occur, an agreement concerning Sudan could emerge as a secondary outcome, potentially even offering Trump a chance to enjoy recognition as an unforeseen peacemaker. Such a development would not halt violence or introduce democracy, but it would create an environment conducive to substantive discussions. A comparable assessment applies to Ethiopia and its strained interactions with a coalition led by Egypt, which includes Eritrea and Somalia. Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, like numerous other African leaders, depends significantly on Emirati generosity. A reduction in tensions within the Horn of Africa could be achieved if Egypt and the UAE harmonize their strategic approaches. The Biden administration’s approach to the Horn of Africa neither adhered to principled multilateralism nor demonstrated a willingness to utilize its influence with the Gulf states. Its representatives managed only modest achievements, such as temporary ceasefires or the opening of checkpoints for humanitarian convoys. The complex conflicts in Sudan, Ethiopia, and surrounding nations demand decisive intervention—and if he chose to, Trump might resolve the intricate problem. However, the potential for widespread conflict remains substantial. The Trump White House is improbable to curb aggressive inclinations among Middle Eastern powerbrokers or African leaders. Consequently, particularly during the anticipated US policy void in the coming months, any of these leaders might initiate a conflict, assured that America would not intervene. During his initial term, Trump exhibited no engagement with the US military presence in Africa. Seemingly impulsively, he commanded the pullout of American forces from Somalia, where they were engaged in combat against the jihadist organization al-Shabab—a directive later rescinded by the Biden administration. It is improbable that Trump will devote attention to the Pentagon’s anti-jihadist operations in that region or the West African Sahel, unless a significant event involving American casualties occurs. Furthermore, America’s allies in the Middle East will be eager for the US to maintain its military installation in Djibouti. Accounts suggesting collaboration between Yemen’s Houthis and al-Shabab, which elevate the potential for assaults in East Africa or against maritime traffic in the Indian Ocean, might reignite US engagement in military actions. As an alternative, such operations could be delegated to allied nations like the UAE or to private military companies. Kenyan President William Ruto’s positive relationship with Biden is unlikely to yield advantages for him, yet Kenya’s recently acquired designation as a “major non-Nato ally”—and its deployment of police personnel to Haiti—will probably ensure its continued favorable standing within the Department of Defense. West Africa currently serves as the epicenter for the globe’s most dynamic jihadist organizations, alongside a surge of coup leaders who have forged agreements with Russia’s security entity, the Wagner Group, now integrated into its Africa Corps. Should Trump perceive West Africa through the lens of relations with Moscow and his anticipated agreement with President Vladimir Putin concerning the conflict in Ukraine, it would introduce an unpredictable element into the region’s political landscape. However, friction would emerge due to his ally, Morocco, which harbors its own aspirations for strategic dominance throughout West Africa. Morocco is a major non-Nato ally and has expressed apprehension regarding Russian influence in Algeria, Libya, and the Sahel—creating a volatile combination that would be agitated if Trump were to strike agreements with Putin. Transactional political approaches entail forging agreements with coup leaders and warlords, whose past offenses effectively serve as their qualifications. African Union (AU) tenets, such as the prohibition of unconstitutional alterations in government, would be overlooked. Nigeria’s President Bola Tinubu, while