From the outset of his coaching career, Ruben Amorim has consistently employed a three-at-the-back formation. As Manchester United fans anticipate the arrival of a highly-regarded and skilled coach, celebrated by analysts, from outside Europe’s ‘big five’ leagues, concerns about familiarity with past managerial tenures might arise. However, supporters can be assured that Amorim will differ significantly from Erik ten Hag in one key area. A primary criticism leveled against the dismissed Dutch manager was the persistent lack of coherent football and an unclear tactical identity even after more than two seasons. Amorim, set to depart Portuguese champions Sporting for Old Trafford next month, is recognized as a meticulous and resolute tactical strategist. Amorim’s football philosophy, characterized by an aggressive press, proactive possession play, a bold high defensive line, and an intricate, adaptable 3-4-3 formation, will be thoroughly ingrained through detailed training sessions. Nevertheless, legitimate concerns exist. A significant question is how Manchester United’s current squad, assembled under Ten Hag, will adapt to a back-three system and a tactical framework fundamentally different from previous approaches. This transition may not be suitable for all players. Given United’s reported £113m net loss for 2023-24, a £15m compensation payment for Ten Hag’s dismissal, and an expenditure of at least £9m to secure Amorim from Sporting, in addition to £200m spent on summer transfers, the Portuguese manager is anticipated to have limited funds for January acquisitions. This section examines the potential beneficiaries and those who might struggle following Amorim’s appointment. Those familiar with Amorim refer to him as ‘The second special one’. In August, Manchester United acquired defender Matthijs de Ligt from Bayern Munich for a sum exceeding £38m. Amorim primarily operates as an adaptable tactician. He employs a deep defensive line when necessary and a high press when feasible; he will utilize precise possession-based football in certain matches and instruct his players to deliver longer diagonal passes to wide players in others. As an illustration, Sporting led the Portuguese league in both build-up attacks (126) and direct attacks (74) during the previous season. However, the 3-4-3 formation remains a constant in his approach, a factor reportedly influencing Liverpool’s preference for Arne Slot over Amorim following Jurgen Klopp’s departure this summer. Consequently, Manchester United will adopt a back three for the first time in ten years, a system last seen during the initial period of Louis van Gaal’s tenure in 2014. The average player positions for Sporting in their 3-0 win against Estoril in September 2024 demonstrate the meticulous tactical organization characteristic of Amorim’s teams. Matthijs de Ligt, the prominent summer acquisition, is identified as the player most likely to face difficulties. He appeared uncomfortable when Bayern Munich utilized a back three under Julian Nagelsmann in 2022-23 and was excluded from van Gaal’s Netherlands back three after only one match at the 2022 World Cup. Harry Maguire is Manchester United’s sole player accustomed to a back three. This lack of experience is especially worrying because Amorim’s assertive high defensive line creates vulnerabilities in wide areas and behind the defense. The Premier League’s growing emphasis on rapid transitions could exploit this weakness, as evidenced by Manchester City’s dominant 5-0 Champions League victory over Sporting in Lisbon in 2022, which highlighted a potential drawback of Amorim’s strategy. Conversely, any disadvantages arising from this tactical shift could be mitigated by the fundamental defensive benefit of transitioning from a back four to a back five. Last season, United allowed the second-highest number of shots among teams in Europe’s ‘big five’ leagues (667), while Sporting, employing a compact 5-4-1 system without possession, conceded the fewest shots in the Primeira Liga (269). In Amorim’s teams, wing-backs are vital in attack, widening the play to enable wingers to move centrally and position themselves close to the striker. Manchester United’s squad currently lacks natural wing-backs, but should Amorim decide to convert players, he will favor those with stronger attacking capabilities over defensive ones. This profile accurately describes Diogo Dalot, who generated 38 chances in the Premier League last season, ranking him third among United players, and who could be advanced into this role. However, the defensive aspect remains significant. Dalot has faced criticism this season for struggles in defending the back post, particularly for failing to track Brennan Johnson on the opening goal in a 3-0 loss to Tottenham Hotspur and Crysencio Summerville in the recent 2-1 defeat at West Ham. A visual representation of Diogo Dalot’s passes during the West Ham 2-1 Man Utd match on 27 October 2024 indicates successful passes in green and unsuccessful ones in red. As an alternative, Amorim might opt for an unconventional approach or explore United’s highly regarded youth academy. This season, he successfully converted Sporting’s skillful 17-year-old winger Geovany Quenda into a wing-back. Consequently, Amad Diallo could emerge as an unexpected competitor to Dalot for that position. A visual representation of Sporting right wing-back Geovany Quenda’s passes during the Famalicao 0-3 Sporting match on 26 October 2024 indicates successful passes in green and unsuccessful ones in red. Manuel Ugarte transferred to Manchester United in an agreement valued at up to £50m. The player acquired to address Ten Hag’s well-known “donut” – the midfield void created when United’s attackers press and defenders retreat – has previously thrived under Amorim. Ugarte established his reputation at Sporting, where in 2022-23, he led the Portuguese league in tackles and interceptions (179), serving as the primary defensive midfielder in Amorim’s double pivot system. He possesses the potential to be a leader on the pitch, a player who already exemplifies Amorim’s tactical principles and motivates teammates to emulate his intensity. A visual analysis of Manchester United’s tackles and interceptions during their 2-0 loss to Tottenham in August 2023 clearly illustrates the “Ten Hag ‘donut'” problem, referring to the central midfield gap. It highlights the limited number of defensive actions performed in that area. Numerous pundits have analyzed United’s uncoordinated pressing, with Sky’s Jamie Carragher notably describing Ten Hag’s team as “one of the worst coached

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *