Syrian Minorities Seek Reassurance Amidst Country’s New Political Landscape

Upon entering Mezzeh 86, a working-class district situated in western Damascus, a checkpoint staffed by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) fighters permitted passage. The structures in this area appear dilapidated and require renovation. This neighborhood is predominantly inhabited by members of Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite sect, a branch of Shia Islam that constitutes one of Syria’s largest religious minority groups. For five decades under the Assad family’s governance, Alawites held sway in the predominantly Sunni Muslim nation, occupying senior roles within the government, military, and intelligence apparatus. Currently, numerous individuals within this community express apprehension regarding potential retribution, subsequent to the Assad regime’s downfall by HTS-led rebels, a Sunni Islamist organization formerly affiliated with al-Qaeda in Syria. Dozens of Alawites reached via telephone declined to comment, with many citing fear. However, within Mezzeh 86, the visible presence of HTS fighters at a checkpoint did not seem to provoke apprehension. A significant number of Alawites approached to speak, eager to disassociate themselves from the Assad government. Mohammad Shaheen, a 26-year-old pharmacy student, stated, “During the Assad regime, the stereotype about the Alawites is that they got all the work opportunities and that they are wealthy. But, in fact, most Alawites are poor and you’ll only find one among a thousand who is rich.” He further remarked, “Even when HTS went to Alawite villages near the coast, they found all villages were poor. Only the Assad family amassed wealth,” referencing the Alawite stronghold located in the western part of the country. Hasan Dawood, a shopkeeper, corroborated this sentiment, stating, “We were slaves for him – drivers, cooks and cleaners.” A feeling of betrayal was also expressed. Mohammad commented, “Bashar was a traitor. And the way he fled was cowardly. He should have at least addressed people and told us what was happening. He left without a word, which made the situation chaotic.” Nevertheless, individuals from the Alawite community, including those residing in this specific neighborhood, had indeed served within Assad’s security apparatus. The question was posed whether they harbored fears of retaliation. Thaier Shaheen, a construction worker, responded, “Those who were in the military and did bad things have fled. No-one knows where they are. They are afraid of revenge.” He added, “But people who don’t have blood on their hands, they are not scared, and have stayed back.” While some reports indicate isolated reprisal killings in various regions of the country, no evidence has emerged thus far to attribute these actions to HTS. Mohammad stated, “Until now, we are OK. We are talking to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and they are respectful. But there are people who aren’t from HTS but pretend to be them who are making threats. They want our society to fail and they are the ones we are scared of.” Following their capture of Damascus, HTS and its allied factions declared that individuals from the overthrown regime implicated in torture and killings would face accountability, though the precise nature of this justice remains undefined at present. HTS additionally affirmed its commitment to safeguarding the rights and freedoms of religious and ethnic minority groups. The organization possesses a history rooted in jihadism, from which it claims to have disengaged. However, its current identity is Islamist, prompting widespread inquiry into the potential ramifications for Syria’s diverse societal fabric. Youssef Sabbagh, a Christian lawyer, expressed, “I’m so happy because the Assad regime fell. This is like a dream come true. No-one wants to live under dictatorship. But there is concern. I have to be realistic.” He continued, “HTS are here now, and they are an Islamic militia. That’s what they are. I wish, I pray they will be a modern Islamic militia.” Sabbagh further articulated, “I speak not just as a Christian, a lot of Syrians, Muslims and everyone, we don’t want Syria to become another Afghanistan, we don’t want to become a new Libya. We have already suffered a lot.” Syria hosts one of the world’s most ancient Christian communities, with the nation containing several well-known sacred locations. At the outset of the 2011 uprising against Assad, Christians initially exhibited hesitancy in aligning with either faction, though ultimately, individuals from this community participated in combat on both sides of the conflict. During the preceding week, Jacques Murad, the Archbishop of Homs, informed the BBC that three meetings had already occurred with HTS, during which they were able to openly convey their perspectives and anxieties. To date, the indications have been largely reassuring for numerous Christians. Establishments serving alcohol, such as bars and restaurants, are operating in the Christian quarter of Old Damascus and elsewhere in the city. Christmas decorations are also visible in many locations. In a restaurant located in the Old City, an encounter took place with Ouday al-Khayat, a lawyer who identifies as a Shia Muslim. He remarked, “There’s no doubt that there’s anticipation and anxiety. The signs that come from HTS are good, but we must wait and watch.” He further elaborated, “It’s not possible to know the opinions of all Shia but there is a concern about a scenario similar to Libya or Iraq. I believe, though, that Syria is different. Syrian society has been diverse for a very long time.” A journey of approximately 110 kilometers (70 miles) was undertaken southeast from Damascus, traversing black volcanic terrain, to reach the city of Suweida, which hosts the majority of Syria’s Druze inhabitants. The Druze faith, while also an offshoot of Shia Islam, possesses a distinct identity and set of doctrines. A considerable number of Druze maintained loyalty to the Assad regime, under the conviction that it would safeguard minority groups. However, dissent progressively increased throughout the conflict, marked by regular protests in recent years. The most recent wave of protests commenced in Suweida’s central square in August 2023 and persisted until the collapse of the regime. Activist Wajiha al-Hajjar posits that these protests did not face the brutal suppression seen elsewhere in Syria, attributing this to Assad’s desire to demonstrate to the international community and his foreign partners his commitment to minority protection. She elaborated, “They did try to suppress our protest but in a different way – not through weapons or shelling, but by depriving us of passports and civil rights, and access to official documents. It became difficult to leave Suweida and a kind of siege was imposed.” Hundreds continue to assemble daily in the square. During the visit, a celebratory atmosphere prevailed, with music emanating from a loudspeaker and young children performing gymnastics, met with applause and cheers from their families. Wajiha stated, “We are celebrating the fall of the regime, but this gathering is also a show of strength. In the event that there is an extreme regime with extreme laws, we are prepared to stay in this square and demand our rights and demand equality.” Under Assad’s rule, Suweida enjoyed a quasi-autonomous status, which the Druze community seeks to maintain. This exemplifies the intricate diversity of Syrian society and the formidable challenges confronting the nation’s nascent government. Additional reporting was contributed by Aamir Peerzada, Leen Al-Saadi, and Sanjay Ganguly. Copyright 2024 BBC. All rights reserved.