Syria’s New De Facto Leader: Political Acumen and the Question of Future Pledges

Upon departing London nearly two weeks ago, following the rebel coalition’s capture of Aleppo – a significant triumph overshadowed by subsequent events – the expectation was to cover an ongoing armed conflict. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) was advancing rapidly, yet the assumption was that the regime would offer resistance, consistent with its actions during territorial losses prior to Russia’s 2015 intervention, which involved bombing Syrian localities. Nearly a decade later, it became evident that Bashar al-Assad’s allies from Russia, Iran, and Lebanon had other conflicts demanding their attention. Despite the regime’s difficulties with reluctant conscripts, it consistently managed to enlist Syrians willing to fight and die for its cause, even during the peak of the war after 2011, when rebel forces held sway over significant portions of Damascus beyond the city center and the route to Beirut. The author frequently visited these frontline combatants. A significant number of the most effective military units were commanded by officers from Assad’s own Alawite community. In Aleppo, around 2015, an Alawite general distributed glasses of expertly distilled arak, served from bottles that had previously contained Jack Daniels. He stated with pride that the arak, an aniseed-based spirit widely consumed throughout the Middle East, originated from the Assad family’s hometown in the hills behind the port of Latakia. Simultaneously, his unit was bombarding the rebel-controlled eastern sector of the city. However, not all loyalists were Alawites. In Jobar, a district situated on the periphery of central Damascus, a Christian officer from the Syrian Arab Army, loyal to Assad, guided the author through tunnels they had excavated beneath the ruins to engage rebels. He recounted how the rebels also possessed tunnels and how, at times, they would breach each other’s underground passages, resulting in fatalities in the darkness. This young man bore a crucifix tattoo on his wrist and wore another around his neck, explaining his necessity to fight in defense of his community against jihadi extremists on the opposing side. The author’s initial assessment regarding the fighting resolve of Assad’s diminished loyalist forces proved entirely mistaken. On Saturday, December 7, the author retired for the night after receiving reports of Homs’ fall. By morning, Bashar al-Assad was en route to Russia, and rebel fighters had begun celebrating in the streets of Damascus. More celebratory gunfire was discharged into the air than rounds fired in combat against Assad’s loyalists, who were fleeing for their lives. Hundreds of vehicles were observed queuing at the Lebanese border, filled with disillusioned, defeated men and terrified families. Regular soldiers abandoned their uniforms and weapons without engaging in combat and returned home. The Assad regime disintegrated, weakened by corruption, brutality, and a callous disregard for Syrian lives. Even Assad’s own Alawite community did not defend him. Consequently, on Thursday evening this week, rather than seeking refuge from shelling and gunfire on a cold street in Homs or Hama, as anticipated, the author traversed the marble corridors of the presidential palace in Damascus alongside Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s de facto leader. He has relinquished his military attire and exchanged his wartime alias, Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, for his actual name. Many Syrians express skepticism regarding his assertion that he has also traded his former jihadist convictions for a more moderate form of Syrian religious nationalism. It is accurate that he severed ties with al Qaeda in 2016, following an extensive career as a jihadist combatant in Iraq and Syria. However, as observed in Assad’s palace, Ahmed al-Sharaa, a tall, soft-spoken man in his early forties, shows hesitation in providing precise details about his desired vision for Syria. He projects an image of high intelligence and political shrewdness. Similar to many astute politicians, he frequently avoids giving direct answers to straightforward inquiries. He refuted the notion that he intended for Syria to transform into a Middle Eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban, he stated, governed “a tribal society. Syria is entirely different.” He affirmed that Syria’s new leadership would honor its culture and history. When questioned about whether women would retain the freedoms they have grown accustomed to, he noted that 60 per cent of university students in Idlib, his stronghold, were female. However, he sidestepped a query regarding the mandatory wearing of hijab – Islamic dress – for women. Damascus has been rife with reports of bearded HTS members instructing women to cover their hair. The author highlighted a significant social media controversy that arose after a woman requested a selfie with him and subsequently covered her head with her hood when the photograph was taken. Conservatives voiced criticism of al-Sharaa for agreeing to pose with a woman who was not a family member. Liberals, conversely, interpreted her hood as an ominous sign for Syria’s future. He did not display exasperation at the question. He responded, “I did not force her. But it’s my personal freedom. I want photos taken for me the way that suits me. I did not force her. That’s not the same as having a law about it that applies countrywide. But there is a culture in this country that the law needs to recognise.” Al-Sharaa was referencing the widespread piety among many Syrians, extending beyond just the majority Sunni Muslim community. Numerous women wear the hijab. Secular Syrians, however, would argue that the crucial aspect is the ability to choose. Over half a century of Assad’s rule, Syrians developed coping mechanisms that frequently involved suppressing their true feelings and adhering to expectations. Shocked and apprehensive secular Syrians presented videos on their phones depicting mass prayers outside universities when students returned last Sunday, questioning whether this was genuine devotion or young people complying with instructions, a pattern ingrained throughout their lives. Al-Sharaa stated that these matters would ultimately be determined by a new constitution, to be decided by a panel of legal experts. Critics of al-Sharaa, however, will highlight that, in the current situation, he selects the individuals who will serve on the committee responsible for drafting both new laws and the new constitution. Ahmed al-Sharaa primarily wished to discuss the former regime’s oppression of the populace. He asserted, “The Syrian problems are far too bigger than the issues you are asking about. Half the population was kicked out of Syria or forcibly displaced from their houses. They were targeted with barrel bombs and unguided dumb bombs and over 250 chemical attacks. Many Syrians drowned at sea trying to escape to Europe.” He acknowledged that Syria’s prospects for stabilization and reconstruction are nonexistent without the lifting of sanctions. These sanctions were initially imposed on the Assad regime. To maintain them, he argued, would be to treat the victim identically to the oppressor. He denied that the group he leads constitutes a terror organization, a classification currently held by the UN and most of the world’s most influential nations. Engagements with foreign diplomats indicate that alterations to both the sanctions and terrorist designations might be achievable. He reacted dismissively when the author noted that diplomats had informed him that a change in status would