India’s Demographic Shift: Why a Populous Nation Seeks More Children

India, which surpassed China last year to become the world’s most populous nation with approximately 1.45 billion inhabitants according to UN projections, is now experiencing a notable increase in discussions regarding the desire for more children. Recently, political figures in two southern states, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, have publicly supported the idea of having more children. Andhra Pradesh is reportedly considering offering incentives, citing concerns over declining fertility rates and an aging populace. The state has also eliminated its “two-child policy” for local body elections, with indications that neighboring Telangana might soon implement a similar change. Tamil Nadu, adjacent to Andhra Pradesh, is also expressing comparable, albeit more pronounced, sentiments. India has experienced a substantial decline in its fertility rate, decreasing from 5.7 births per woman in 1950 to its current rate of two. In 17 of the 29 states and territories, fertility rates have dropped below the replacement level of two births per woman, which is defined as the rate necessary for new births to sustain a stable population. The five southern Indian states have spearheaded India’s demographic transition, reaching replacement-level fertility considerably earlier than other regions. Kerala achieved this benchmark in 1988, Tamil Nadu in 1993, and the remaining states by the mid-2000s. Currently, the total fertility rates in these five southern states are below 1.6, with Karnataka registering 1.6 and Tamil Nadu at 1.4. This indicates that their fertility rates are equivalent to or lower than those observed in numerous European countries. However, these states are apprehensive that India’s evolving demographics, characterized by differing population proportions among states, will substantially affect their electoral representation, the state-wise distribution of parliamentary seats, and federal revenue allocations. Srinivas Goli, a professor of demography at the International Institute for Population Sciences, informed the BBC that “They fear being penalised for their effective population control policies, despite being better economic performers and contributing significantly to federal revenues.” Furthermore, southern states are contending with another significant issue as India prepares for its initial delimitation of electoral seats in 2026, marking the first such exercise since 1976. This process is set to redefine electoral boundaries to account for population changes, which is anticipated to result in a reduction of parliamentary seats for the economically thriving southern states. Given that federal revenues are distributed based on state populations, many are concerned that this could exacerbate their financial difficulties and restrict their autonomy in policy formulation. Demographers KS James and Shubhra Kriti forecast that populous northern states, including Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, are poised to gain additional seats from the delimitation process, whereas southern states such as Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Andhra Pradesh might experience losses, thereby further altering political representation. Numerous individuals, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, have suggested that alterations to fiscal shares and parliamentary seat allocations will not be implemented hastily. Mr. Goli states, “As a demographer, I don’t think states should be overly concerned about these issues. They can be resolved through constructive negotiations between federal and state governments.” He adds, “My concern lies elsewhere.” According to demographers, the primary challenge facing India is its accelerated population aging, a direct consequence of falling fertility rates. Mr. Goli points out that while nations such as France and Sweden required 120 and 80 years, respectively, to double their aging population from 7% to 14%, India is projected to achieve this benchmark in merely 28 years. This expedited aging process is linked to India’s distinctive achievement in fertility reduction. In most nations, enhanced living standards, educational attainment, and urbanization naturally contribute to lower fertility as child survival rates improve. However, in India, fertility rates decreased swiftly despite limited socio-economic advancement, attributed to assertive family welfare initiatives that encouraged smaller families through targets, incentives, and disincentives. An unforeseen outcome is exemplified by Andhra Pradesh, which has a fertility rate of 1.5, comparable to Sweden, yet its per capita income is 28 times lower, as noted by Mr. Goli. The question arises whether states facing increasing debt and constrained resources can adequately fund higher pensions or social security for a rapidly aging populace. Furthermore, according to the latest India Ageing Report from the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), over 40% of elderly Indians (aged 60 and above) fall into the poorest wealth quintile, representing the bottom 20% of the population by wealth distribution. As Mr. Goli articulates, “India is getting old before getting rich.” A reduced birth rate also translates to an increasing old-age dependency ratio, resulting in fewer individuals available to provide care for a growing elderly population. Demographers caution that India’s healthcare system, community centers, and old-age homes are inadequately prepared for this impending demographic change. Urbanization, internal migration, and evolving labor markets are progressively diminishing traditional family support, historically a strength in India, consequently leaving more elderly individuals without care. While the movement of people from densely populated to less populated states could alleviate the working-age deficit, it concurrently incites anti-migration concerns. Mr. Goli asserts, “Robust investments in prevention, palliative care, and social infrastructure are urgently needed to look after the ageing.” In addition to the apprehensions expressed by the southern states, earlier this month, Mohan Bhagwat, the chief of the Hindu nationalist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteers’ Organisation), which serves as the ideological foundation of Mr. Modi’s BJP, exhorted couples to have a minimum of three children to safeguard India’s future. Mohan Bhagwat reportedly stated at a recent gathering, “According to population science, when growth falls below 2.1, a society perishes on its own. Nobody destroys it.” While Mr. Bhagwat’s concerns may possess some validity, demographers indicate that they are not entirely precise. Tim Dyson, a demographer at the London School of Economics, informed the BBC that persistent “very low levels of fertility will lead to rapid population decline” after a period of one to two decades. A fertility rate of 1.8 births per woman results in a gradual, controllable population decrease. However, a rate of 1.6 or below could initiate “rapid, unmanageable population decline.” Mr. Dyson explains, “Smaller numbers of people will enter the reproductive – and main working – ages, and this will be socially, politically and economically disastrous. This is a demographic process and it is extremely difficult to reverse.” This demographic phenomenon is already observable in several nations. In May, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol designated the nation’s historically low birth rate as a “national emergency” and unveiled proposals for a specialized government ministry. Greece’s fertility rate has fallen sharply to 1.3, representing half its 1950 level, prompting Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis to issue warnings about an “existential” population threat. Nevertheless, demographers contend that encouraging individuals to have more children is ineffective. Mr. Dyson states, “Considering the societal shifts, including the significant reduction in gender disparities as women’s lives have become increasingly similar to those of men, this trend is unlikely to reverse.” For Indian states such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala, which are contending with a diminishing workforce, a crucial inquiry arises: who will occupy these vacant roles? Developed nations, finding it impossible to reverse declining fertility, are concentrating on promoting healthy and active aging, extending working lives by five to seven years, and boosting productivity among older demographics. Demographers suggest that India will need to substantially raise retirement ages, and policies must prioritize extending healthy years through improved health screenings and more robust social security measures to cultivate an active and productive older population, potentially yielding a “silver dividend.” India must also more effectively capitalize on its demographic dividend, which refers to the economic growth that arises when a nation possesses a substantial working-age population. Mr. Goli contends that a window of opportunity exists until 2047 to stimulate the economy, generate employment for the working-age demographic, and allocate funds for the aging population. He states, “We’re only reaping 15-20% of the dividend – we can do much better.”