North Korean Troops in Russia’s War: Current Insights

North Korea’s dispatch of military personnel to participate alongside Russian forces in Ukraine has garnered international attention, alongside conjecture regarding their potential deployment on the battlefield. Pyongyang has dispatched a minimum of 10,000 troops to Russia, according to Kyiv and Seoul, who have also reported an increase in North Korean casualties since their engagement in combat began in early December. The reported casualty figures differ. South Korea stated this week that over 1,000 North Korean troops have been either killed or wounded, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky cited the figure at 3,000. Pentagon officials had verified the occurrence of casualties but refrained from providing a specific number. The Pentagon indicated that these soldiers appeared to be utilized in infantry capacities within the Kursk border region, an area Moscow has been attempting to reclaim from Ukraine, suggesting that North Korean troops might not have been deployed across the border into Ukraine itself. This information surfaces nearly two months after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and South Korean officials accused Pyongyang of deploying troops to support Russia’s invasion. However, limited details have emerged since then, and Moscow and Pyongyang have not directly addressed these reports. Estimates for troop numbers have varied, from approximately 11,000, a Pentagon calculation, to as many as 100,000, according to unnamed sources cited in Bloomberg news. Initially, their absence of combat experience was presented as a primary justification for potentially assigning them to non-combat roles. Nevertheless, that premise was reconsidered after the US and Ukraine affirmed that North Korean troops had engaged in direct combat with Ukrainian soldiers. So, what is understood about the involvement of North Korean troops in Russia’s conflict? In essence, definitive information is scarce. The reclusive North Korea possesses one of the globe’s largest armed forces, comprising 1.28 million active soldiers, yet, unlike Russia, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) lacks recent combat exposure. Pyongyang’s army is “thoroughly indoctrinated but with low readiness,” states Mark Cancian, from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). However, he does not perceive them as expendable, adding that such a characterisation is “Ukrainian bravado.” Ukrainian and South Korean intelligence agencies have indicated that many of the soldiers sent to Russia represent some of Pyongyang’s elite, drawn from the 11th Corps, also known as the Storm Corps. This unit specializes in infiltration, infrastructure sabotage, and assassinations. These soldiers are “trained to withstand a high degree of physical pain and psychological torture,” according to Michael Madden, a North Korea expert affiliated with the Stimson Center in Washington. “What they lack in combat they make up for with what they can tolerate physically and mentally,” he further notes. Mr. Cancian concurs that “if these are special operations forces, they will be much better prepared than the average North Korean unit.” He further states: “The Russians appear to be giving them additional training, likely on the special circumstances of the war in Ukraine.” This assertion is corroborated by social media videos, which depict individuals believed to be North Koreans in Russian uniforms, at what seem to be military training facilities in Russia. As the conflict in Ukraine approaches its third year, North Korean troops might be “the best capable” among the military personnel available to Russia, remarks Chun In-bum, a retired South Korean army lieutenant-general. North Korean soldiers who had defected over the past decade or so informed the BBC that underestimating Pyongyang’s troops would be an error. These interviews provided insights into the conditions of these troops on the Ukrainian frontline. Moscow has been enlisting at least 20,000 new soldiers monthly to reinforce its war efforts, with an average of over 1,000 Russian soldiers killed or wounded daily, according to Nato. “[Russia] has been sending troops to the front without proper training. Compared to such recruits, North Koreans are trained and motivated. They are not combat-tested currently, but that soon will not be the case,” Lt-Gen (retd) Chun observed. Nonetheless, some experts contend that the language barrier and unfamiliarity with Russian operational systems would complicate any combat assignments. They propose instead that Pyongyang’s forces are being utilized for their engineering and construction proficiencies. “For North Korea, [such deployments are] a good way to earn money,” explains Andrei Lankov, director of the Korea Risk Group. South Korean intelligence estimates that Moscow compensates Pyongyang $2,000 (£1,585) per soldier each month, with the majority of these funds ultimately deposited into the state’s treasury. Pyongyang could also gain access to Russian military technology, which Moscow would otherwise have been hesitant to transfer, Mr. Lankov adds. For Moscow, the presence of North Korean troops could help address its widely documented manpower shortages. The US estimates that approximately 600,000 Russian troops have been killed or wounded since the invasion of Ukraine commenced in 2022. Moscow has sought to “minimise domestic political impact” by offering incentives to volunteer recruits and enlisting foreign nationals with the promise of citizenship, notes Mr. Cancian from CSIS. In September this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a directive, for the third occasion since the war began, to expand his military. “With Russia reportedly suffering over 1,000 casualties on the battlefield [per day], reducing its own losses could alleviate some pressure on the Putin regime,” agrees Lami Kim, a professor of Security Studies at the Daniel K Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. These developments are a source of concern for Seoul, particularly as tensions escalate on the Korean peninsula. In October, the North demolished sections of two roads connecting it to South Korea, days after accusing Seoul of deploying drones into Pyongyang. This occurred after the two nations engaged in reciprocal actions, sending thousands of trash and propaganda balloons into each other’s territories. The Koreas have also suspended an agreement aimed at reducing military tensions, shortly after the North declared the South was “enemy number one.” Consequently, South Korea is apprehensive about the North acquiring enhanced military capabilities. Troops in South Korea have also not participated in a major conflict since the Vietnam war, which concluded in 1975. And Seoul is concerned that “its adversary could boast more hostile capabilities” as a result of the combat experience its soldiers would gain on the battlefield, Lt-Gen (retd) Chun states. While South Korea has accused the North of also providing weaponry to Russia, it asserts that dispatching troops represents a significant escalation beyond that. It has also articulated “grave concern” regarding a pact between Pyongyang and Moscow, which commits the two nations to mutual assistance in the event of “aggression” against either country. Furthermore, it has reiterated its consideration of providing aid to Ukraine “for defensive purposes.” Should this occur, it would signify a departure from South Korea’s long-standing policy of not supplying armaments to countries involved in active conflicts.